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COMMENT
WILLIAM L. TAYLOR*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the sphere of equality what makes the United States Consti-
tution a living, vital document is the work of the Supreme Court
over the last three decades. I wish to describe that work and suggest
to you that we are all better off as a result of it. Indeed, we would
have very little to celebrate in this bicentennial year without it. In
addition, I will defend the Court's work against attacks on its legiti-
macy and wisdom. Finally, I will discuss briefly the rather extraordi-
nary referendum that the Nation will have on the Supreme Court's
work in the critical areas of equality, individual rights, and liberties
when the Senate votes on whether to approve Robert Bork's nomi-
nation as a Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
II. THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY IN THE MODERN ERA
The constitutional concept of equality in the modern era is
rooted in the Supreme Court's 1954 decision, Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation.' It is continued to this day in the Court's interpretations of
the equal protection clause and civil rights laws.
The concept of equality adopted by the Court in Brown was not
supported by the legislative branch of the federal government until
ten years after the decision, when Congress passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.2 Congressional support, however, has continued since
that time. In fact, Congress has expanded the concept of equality in
some respects. For example, it has imposed obligations on private
employers not to discriminate in the job market,' and on proprie-
tors of restaurants, hotels, and other places of public accommoda-
tion to serve black people.4 In a few cases Congress has
unsuccessfully sought to narrow the concept of equality. Primarily,
though, Congress has provided the means for enforcing constitu-
* Civil rights and education practice, Washington, D.C. Adjunct Professor of Law,
Georgetown University. B.A., Brooklyn College, 1952; LL.B, Yale Law School, 1954.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 28
and 42 U.S.C. (1982)).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-16 (1982).
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a to 2000a-6 (1982).
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tional rights declared by the Court.5
The executive branch gave support to the Brown decision and
its principles of equality in 1961, three years earlier than did Con-
gress, but that support lasted only until 1981. Since then the equal-
ity embodied by Brown has been under severe and sustained attack
from the Reagan administration. This attack has focused on the ba-
sic remedies for discrimination adopted by the judiciary and Con-
gress in public6 and private schools,7 employment,8 and voting.'
I will discuss briefly the Court's work on equality and ask you to
imagine what our country would be like without it.
In the area of race, the Court called for the dismantling of the
caste system that had kept black people as a subject class for the
better part of two centuries. The caste system was formal in the
South and informal in much of the rest of the Nation.' 0
After an era of massive resistance, the Court ultimately ad-
dressed the question of remedy and adopted an affirmative, com-
mon-sense approach. The Justices recognized the great danger in
tendering formal equality without real content, as occurred after Re-
construction. Therefore, the Supreme Court was careful to respect
the rights and interests of all people. The Court tried to assure gen-
uine opportunity for black people who had been denied it. This led
not only to equality of results, but to real opportunities for educa-
tion, jobs, and access to important services. I I
The pioneering work of the Court in Brown has borne fruit in
other areas as well, including sex discrimination. Despite the states'
failure to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment and despite the
5. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1982)); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 28 and
42 U.S.C. (1982)).
6. See, e.g., Authorization Request of Civil Rights Division of Justice Dep 't. Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 328 (1985) (testimony of William L. Taylor) [hereinafter Hearings].
7. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (non-profit pri-
vate schools with admission standards that discriminate on the basis of religious doc-
trine do not qualify as tax-exempt organizations under the Internal Revenue Code, nor
are contributions to such schools deductible as charitable contributions).
8. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 6, at 113 (testimony of Barry L. Goldstein, NAACP
Legal Defense Fund; and William Robinson, Lawyer's Comm. for Civil Rights).
9. See generally Miller, Ronald Reagan and the Technology of Deception, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Feb. 1984, at 65.
10. For an excellent history of how the caste system operated in four communities
that were included in the Brown case, see R. KLUGER, SIMPt.E JUSTICE (1976).
11. See Taylor, Brown, Equal Protection and the Isolation of the Poor, 95 YALE L.J. 1700,
1717-25 (1986).
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Court's application of a lower standard of scrutiny to gender classifi-
cation under the fourteenth amendment, the Court, with the sup-
port of Congress, has attacked the stereotypes that underlie public
policy limiting the ability of women to achieve their potential.' 2
Similarly, the Supreme Court and Congress have begun to strip
away the barriers in public policy and private industry that have pre-
vented disabled persons from participating in and making a contri-
bution to society. t3 The concept of equality has extended to other
corners of our society as well. For instance, the application of prin-
ciples of equality prevented the state of Texas from excluding from
public schools children whose parents are in the country illegally.' 4
It has also prohibited the state of Louisiana from depriving children
whose parents are not legally married the right to sue for the wrong-
ful death of one of the parents.' 5
Finally, some of the most important work by the Court in equal-
ity has been in extending the right to vote and the right to partici-
pate in the political process through civil rights and one person, one
vote decisions.' 6 Far from being exercises of judicial authority at
12. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442
(1987) (upholding affirmative action program designed to improve representation of
women in agency workforce); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982) (striking down single-sex admissions policy of state nursing school); Craig v. Bo-
ren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating state statute prohibiting sale of 3.2% beer to
males under the age of 21 and females under the age of 18); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that statute which, solely for administrative purposes, pro-
vided that spouses of male members of the uniformed services are dependents for pur-
poses of obtaining certain benefits, but that spouses of female members are not
dependents unless they are dependents for over one-half of their support, violated due
process clause of fifth amendment); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that
statute which required that, between persons equally qualified to administer estates,
males must be preferred to females violated the fourteenth amendment).
Congressional enactments designed to improve the status of women include the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982); the Women's Educational Equity Act
of 1978, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3341-3348 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); and the Federal Child Sup-
port Enforcement Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-665 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
13. See, e.g., School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct 1123 (1987) (holding
that a teacher susceptible to tuberculosis was a "handicapped" individual within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act and was therefore covered by the Act); Consolidated
Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984) (holding that the Rehabilitation Act's bar on
employment discrimination extends to programs not receiving federal aid); Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (prohibiting discrimination against qual-
ified handicapped individuals in any program or activity receiving funds from the federal
government, in any activity conducted by any executive agency or by the United States
Postal Service).
14. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
15. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
16. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962).
[VOL. 47:38
TAYLOR: COMMENT ON ROWAN
the expense of the other branches, these decisions enabled state leg-
islatures to be more responsive to the needs of their constituents,
facilitating constitutional policy.
Without these various decisions and the vision of equality they
represent, the United States of America would be a nation more se-
riously riddled by racial and ethnic strife, real and perceived ine-
quality of opportunity, and corrupt local political systems than it is
today. These Supreme Court decisions were not "special interest"
decisions to benefit business or other minority groups. They were
decisions to benefit all of us. As Ralph Ellison wrote in the 1940s,
out of the black struggle for equality would come the creation of "a
more human America."' 7
III. OBJECTIONS TO THE COURT'S WORK ON EQUALITY
In spite of its contribution to equality in the United States to-
day, the Court's work continues to suffer attack. One objection is
that it was the province of the popularly elected branches of govern-
ment, rather than that of the courts, to deal with denial of equality
and that, if only the courts had been patient, the changes eventually
would have been made. Whatever the legal merits of the first claim,
which I will address below, the notion that the other branches would
have acted anyway is dubious.
To understand the weakness of such a proposition, we only
need to recall the era of massive resistance, when the only organized
word from Congress was the Southern Manifesto and when the
President told us that "law cannot change the hearts and minds of
men."" It took the peaceful protest movement led by Dr. Martin
Luther King and the violent repression of that movement to arouse
the Nation's conscience and to impel action by the political branches
of government.
This introduces a key point in understanding the role of the
Court and its work on equality. In Brown and its progeny the Court
did not confer rights on people as if by divine dispensation. The
Brown decision empowered people to organize themselves and thus
improve their situations. The Court simply served as a catalyst, cre-
ating opportunities for people and impelling the other branches to
perform their responsibilities. If the political branches and the ma-
17. See R. ELLISON, AMERICAN DILEMMA: A REVIEW, IN SHADOW AND ACT 302 (1964).
18. In 1958 President Eisenhower said that "[Ilaws themselves will never solve
problems that have their roots in the human heart and in human emotions." R. SAR-
RATF, THE ORDEAL OF SEGREGATION 51 (1966).
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jority of the American people had viewed the Court's work as illegit-
imate, its decisions never would have been implemented.
Much of the criticism of the Court's decisions in the area of
equality comes from people who have never accepted the concept of
judicial review and the principle delineated in Marbury v. Madison "
that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter in interpreting the Con-
stitution. That group of critics includes Attorney General Edwin
Meese who earlier this year suggested that while the Supreme Court
has a role in interpreting the Constitution, other government offi-
cials do not necessarily have to adopt the Court's view. Interest-
ingly, Mr. Meese chose the Court's decision in Board of Education v.
Clark2 o as his prime target. That case was the supreme test of the
rule of law in our era, and if Meese's view was followed, we might
have failed that test.
Others claim that the Court's actions in the area of equality are
illegitimate based on principles of original intent. I will not enter
that debate except to make some brief observations.
First, as Carl Rowan has suggested, if we are not to trivialize the
Constitution, we must look beyond what was in the immediate ken
of that remarkable group in Philadelphia and look instead to their
larger purpose. What we find is powerful rhetoric not only about
equality, but also about other related values such as opportunity and
enterprise. Thomas Jefferson had the foresight to discuss a public
school system before one even existed:
The object is to bring into action that mass of talents which
lies buried in poverty in every country for want of means of
development; and thus give activity to a mass of mind,
which in proportion to our population shall be the double
or treble of what it is in most countries.2
It would be hard to find a better prescription for affirmative action
and indeed for affirmative government.
The debates over the fourteenth amendment and over the vari-
ous laws establishing the Freedmen's Bureau 2 included the same
objections to race-specific action that we hear today-that there was
19. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
20. 400 U.S. 816 (1970).
21. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abbe Jos6 Correa de Serra (Nov. 25, 1817),
reprinted in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 94-95 (H.A. Washington ed. 1864).
22. See, e.g., Freedmen's Bureau Act, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173 (1866). For a general
discussion of the establishment and development of the Freedmen's Bureau, see
Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L.
REV. 753 (1985).
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no reason to treat blacks better than whites. The argument in favor
of race-specific action was also the same then as it is today-give at
least opportunity to people to whom we have done nothing but
wrong.
IV. THE CURRENT CHALLENGE TO EQUALITY
Let me return now to my opening remarks about the upcoming
national referendum on the Constitution. The Reagan administra-
tion has failed over the past six years to reverse the course that I
have described. It has been rebuffed in the Congress, in the courts,
by business, labor, religions, community leaders, and the American
people. It has been defeated with respect to Bob Jones University v.
United States,23 the Voting Rights Act of 1968,24 the school desegre-
gation cases,25 and its assault on affirmative action.26
Now, the administration is making a final attempt, through the
nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the United States Supreme
Court, to accomplish its agenda. In Judge Bork the administration
has found the embodiment of these failed positions, the perfect
King Canute to roll back the tide of liberty and opportunity. Bork
has written a great deal and has made a number of things perfectly
clear. He agrees with the principle established by Brown, but he
disagrees with most of the remedies that have made Brown a living
reality.27 Among his targets have been Shelley v. Kraemer,28 which
barred the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants, the Public
Accommodations Act of 1964,29 the Voting Rights Act of 1965,3o
and the Supreme Court's decision outlawing poll taxes."' If these
23. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1871 (1982).
25. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1 (1958).
26. See generally Days, Turning Back the Clock: The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights,
19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309 (1984) (discussing the Reagan administration's record
on civil rights).
27. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 14
(1971) ("[Tlhe Court, because it is neutral, cannot pick and choose between competing
gratifications, and likewise, cannot write the detailed code the framers omitted, requir-
ing equality in this case but not in another.").
28. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See Bork, supra note 27, at 15 ("[T]he rule of Shelley would
require the Court to deny the freedom of any individual to discriminate in the conduct
of any part of his affairs simply because the contrary result would be state enforcement
of discrimination.").
29. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a to 2000a-6 (1982).
30. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973 to 1973bb-1 (1982)).
31. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The twenty-fourth
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positions lead you to think that Bork's commitment to racial equality
is weak, consider that he believes the fourteenth amendment has
even less of an application to other groups that suffer discrimina-
tion, e.g., women, disabled people, aliens, illegitimate children.
About Skinner v. Oklahoma, a 1942 Supreme Court decision striking
down an Oklahoma law calling for the sterilization of some convicts,
Bork remarked that the decision was one in a line of cases that was
"improper and intellectually empty."3 Bork also opposes vehe-
mently the use of the fourteenth amendment to guarantee the one
person, one vote principle, as well as a host of other decisions deal-
ing with other rights and liberties like the right to privacy.34
With his record of opposition to the current scope of equality
jurisprudence, how can Judge Bork be confirmed? Three shibbo-
leths, if accepted, will lead to his confirmation.
1. Bork's views on these cases reflect not his personal values
but a principled belief in "judicial restraint."
Even assuming this would be a valid defense, in Bork's case it is
not true. He is only a selective advocate ofjudicial restraint. In ref-
erence to Morgan v. Katzenbach," where Congress enacted a statute
expanding the right to vote, Bork was willing to abandon judicial
restraint and strike down the statute. It is only when laws narrowing
personal rights and liberties are challenged that he becomes an
apostle of judicial restraint.
2. Once the nominee gets on the Court he will moderate his
views.
Such a moderation has occurred in the past. Former nominees
such as Justice Powell have moderated their views once on the
amendment, prohibiting states from imposing a poll tax for voting in Presidential and
congressional elections, does not apply to state or local elections. U.S. CONST. amend.
XXIV. In Harper the Supreme Court declared such taxes in state and local elections
unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 383
U.S. at 668.
32. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
33. See Bork, supra note 27, at 11-12.
34. See id. For example, Bork, then a professor at Yale Law School, ridiculed the
decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where the Supreme Court
struck down a state law that made the use of contraceptives by married couples a crimi-
nal offense. He characterized the decision as "unprincipled... both in the way in which
it derives a new constitutional right and in the way it defines that right, or rather fails to
define that right." Id. at 9.
Judge Bork went on to say that substantive due process is an "improper doctrine,"
stating that "[slubstantive due process requires the Court to say, without guidance from
the Constitution, which liberties or qualifications may be infringed by majorities and
which may not." Id. at 1I.
35. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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Court, and such a moderation may occur again with a candidate who
merely thinks that some Supreme Court decisions are wrong. Bork,
however, does not merely think certain decisions are wrong, he
thinks they are disastrous. In his words, some of these decisions
were "unconstitutional" or "judicial usurpation," and that Justice
Warren in Baker v. Carry6 could not "muster a single respectable
supporting argument."-37 Given his views, Bork would betray his
rigid principles if he did not seek to reverse these decisions. In
many areas where the Court is closely divided Bork could prove to
be the decisive vote.
3. Absent incompetence or dishonesty of the nominee, the
President's judicial nomination should be approved.
This view is not supported by "original intent" or by history.
Judicial nominees should not be rejected lightly. But Senators are
elected just as the President is, and they take the same oath of office
as do the President and judges-an oath to support and defend the
Constitution. A Senator would be remiss in his obligation if he
voted to confirm a nominee whose views of the Constitution would
alter rights and immunities that the Senator believes are fundamen-
tal to our legal system. If Senators apply the standard I have sug-
gested, the nomination of Judge Robert Bork will be rejected-not
by forty-one Senators engaging in a filibuster, but by a majority vot-
ing against the nomination.
36. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
37. Bork, The Supreme Court Needs a New Philosophy, FORTUNE, Dec. 1968, at 166.
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